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Supreme Court Approves Stacking of Underinsured Motorist
Coverage-Will Uninsured Coverage Follow?
Underinsured motorist coverage protects innocent victims of automobile
collisions from tortfeasors with insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully
the injured party.1 A type of "first party insurance,' 2 underinsured motorist
coverage pays the injured party the difference between the insured's liability
limit and the amount of the tortfeasor's liability coverage paid to the insured.3
As one element of North Carolina's Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Re-
sponsibility Act of 1953, 4 underinsured motorist coverage supplements unin-
sured motorist coverage. The latter protects the insured when the tortfeasor has
little or no insurance. 5 Despite sharing the unitary purpose of compensating in-
nocent insureds, the statutory provisions governing each type of coverage are
unique.6 This statutory distinction has led to inconsistent protection for injured
motorists.
7
In 1985 the North Carolina General Assembly amended the state's under-
insured motorist statute to permit aggregation, or stacking,8 of underinsured
motorist policies.9 The amendment explicitly provided for interpolicy stack-
ing, 10 but was ambiguous regarding intrapolicy stacking.1 The North Carolina
1. See 2 A. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOroRisT INSURANCE §§ 31.1-31.5,
at 3-7 (2d ed. 1987) (discussing the development and use of underinsured motorist coverage); infra
notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
2. 12A G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:628, at 74 (2d rev. ed. 1981). First
party insurance pays the insured directly, whereas third party coverage pays others injured through
the fault of the insured. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989) (defining "persons in-
sured" for uninsured motorist-and underinsured motorist coverages).
3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989). Of course the injured party may not re-
cover more than her actual damages. Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 543,
155 S.E.2d 128, 136 (1967). Underinsured motorist coverage is commonly referred to as UIM. See
Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 260, 382 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1989). Uninsured
motorist coverage is commonly referred to as UM. See 8C I. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACrIcE § 5066, at 2 (1981).
4. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to - .39 (1989) (original version at ch. 1300, 1953 N.C. Sess.
Laws 1262, 1262-1280). The North Carolina General Assembly added UIM coverage to the Act in
1979. Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 675, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 720, 720-721 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(bX4)); see infra text accompanying notes 24-32.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(bX3); see infra note 30.
6. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(bX3), (4).
7. Compare Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. 365, 368, 339 S.E.2d
472,474 (1986) (interpreting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(g) to limit stacking of uninsured motor-
ist policies) with Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 268, 382 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1989)
(rejecting the same statute as a limitation on stacking of underinsured motorist policies).
8. Stacking is the aggregation of insurance coverages when more than one coverage applies.
12A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 45:628, at 77; see P. PRETZEL, UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 25.5(B),
at 87 (1972) (noting that stacking "usually denotes the availability of more than one policy to the
same insured"); infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
9. Act of July 10, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 862, 862-64 (codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989)). See infra note 69 for relevant text of the amendment. See
generally Note, Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Legislative Solutions to Settlement Difficulties, 64
N.C.L. REv. 1408 (1986) (discussing the impact of the 1985 amendment).
10. Interpolicy stacking refers to the practice of aggregating coverages from more than one
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Supreme Court recently resolved the statute's ambiguity in Sutton v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co. 12 Purporting to follow the legislative intent of the state's
Financial Responsibility Act, the court held that an insured may stack all appli-
cable underinsured motorist coverages whether the insured owns one or more
policies.13
This Note examines Sutton and the supreme court's statutory interpreta-
tion. It reviews attempts by insurers to preclude stacking through policy provi-
sions and examines the resulting North Carolina case law. The Note details the
inconsistent treatment of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages under
North Carolina law and criticizes distinctions made between the two types of
coverage as arbitrary and inequitable. The Note concludes that stacking under-
insured motorist coverage protects innocent victims of automobile accidents and
that the North Carolina courts should extend stacking to uninsured motorist
coverage as well. The Note further concludes that minor statutory revisions
could allow more motorists to derive greater benefit from both types of coverage.
In May 1986 Sherry Sutton suffered severe injuries when an oncoming vehi-
cle struck her car. 14 Sutton filed suit seeking compensatory damages against the
estate of the other driver. The other driver had automobile liability insurance
with a liability limit of 50,000 dollars per person. 15 At the time of the accident
Sutton owned two insurance policies issued by Aetna Casualty & Surety Com-
pany. Each policy covered two vehicles; separate premiums for underinsured
motorist coverage were paid on each of the four insured vehicles. 16
Alleging medical expenses of more than 70,000 dollars, Sutton filed a de-
claratory judgment action against her insurer to stack all four of her underin-
sured motorist coverages. 17 Both of Sutton's policies contained a limitation of
liability clause.18 One purpose of such a clause is to preclude intrapolicy stack-
insurance policy. Intrapolicy stacking refers to the practice of aggregating coverages from two or
more vehicles covered by a single policy. For example, A owns two vehicles covered by separate
insurance policies. Combining the coverages would be interpolicy stacking. If both of A's vehicles
were covered by the same policy, aggregating the two coverages would be intrapolicy stacking.
11. See Note, supra note 9, at 1416-17 (noting the ambiguity of North Carolina law).
12. 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989).
13. Id. at 265, 382 SE.2d at 763. The decision eliminates a potentially arbitrary and unfair
distinction between interpolicy and intrapolicy aggregation. See Note, supra note 9, at 1417 (noting
that "[n]either logic nor equity" supports the distinction between interpolicy and intrapolicy stack-
ing). But see LeCuyer v. Metropolitan Property and Liab. Ins. Co., 401 Mass. 709, 710, 519 N.E.2d
263, 264 (1988) (rejecting intrapolicy stacking, but noting the insured would have been allowed to
stack if separate policies had been maintained on each insured vehicle).
14. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 262, 382 S.E.2d at 761.
15. Id. Nationwide Insurance Company, the other driver's insurer, paid the entire $50,000
coverage into court for Sutton's benefit. Id.
16. Id. at 261, 382 S.E.2d at 761. The policy covering the vehicle Sutton drove the day of the
accident provided $50,000 per person UIM bodily injury coverage on each vehicle. Sutton's other
policy provided $100,000 JIM coverage per person for each of the two vehicles covered. Plaintiff-
Appellant's Brief at 2, Sutton (No. 539PA88).
17. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 262, 382 S.E.2d at 761. Sutton sought both interpolicy and intrapolicy
stacking. By the time her case reached the supreme court, her medical expenses exceeded $100,000.
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 2, Sutton (No. 539PA88).
18. The limitation of liability clause was identical in the two policies. It provided in part: "The
limit of bodily injury liability shown in the Declarations... is the most we will pay for bodily injury...
regardless of the number of- [%]I. COVERED PERSONS; [S]2. Claims made; [q3. Vehicles or premiums
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ing when a single policy covers more than one vehicle.' 9 Upholding the limita-
tion of liability clause in Sutton's policies, the trial court rejected intrapolicy
stacking and found as a matter of law that "[tihe limit of liability for [Sutton's]
underinsured coverage for any one person is established by the terms of the ap-
plicable policies without regard to the number of vehicles listed in said policies
or the premiums paid on said policies."20 After Sutton filed an appeal, the
supreme court took the unusual step of granting discretionary review before the
court of appeals heard the case.21
Reversing the trial court, the supreme court rejected the limitation of liabil-
ity clause as contrary to the underinsured motorist statute.22 Writing for a unan-
imous court, Chief Justice Exum noted that when a statute applies to an
insurance policy, "the provisions of that statute become part of the terms of the
policy," and if the policy conflicts with the' statute, "the provisions of the statute
will prevail."'23
North Carolina, like many states,24 protects the public from the high costs
of automobile collisions by requiring all motor vehicle owners to show proof of
financial responsibility.25 Almost invariably this is accomplished through auto-
mobile liability insurance. 26 The North Carolina Financial Responsibility Act
specifies the minimum amount of liability coverage required to establish finan-
cial responsibility. 27
shown in the Declarations; or [T4. Vehicles involved in the accident." Sutton, 325 N.C. at 261-62,
382 S.E.2d at 761 (emphasis in original).
19. See 2 A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 41.5, at 87.
20. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 261, 382 S.E.2d at 760-61. The trial court approved interpolicy stack-
ing of Sutton's two policies. Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 4, Sutton (No. 539PA88).
21. There are only four circumstances in which the supreme court may certify a cause for
discretionary review prior to determination by the court of appeals. The court may certify the causeif..
(I) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the jurisprudence of the
State, or
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify and thereby cause
substantial harm, or
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the expeditious
administration of justice requires certification.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (1989).
22. See infra note 69 for relevant text of the statute.
23. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 263, 382 S.E.2d at 762 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos,
293 N.C. 431, 441, 238 S.E.2d 597, 604 (1977)).
24. See 1 A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 1.12, at 14 (noting that approximately one-half of the
states require motorists to show financial responsibility).
25. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309 (1989). "Financial responsibility shall be by a liability in-
surance policy or a financial security bond or a financial security deposit or by qualification as a self-
insurer .... ." Id. § 20-309(b). In one recent year, one out of fifteen licensed drivers in North
Carolina was involved in an automobile accident. COLLISION REPORTS SECTION, NORTH CARO-
LINA DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, NORTH CAROLINA TRAFFIC ACCIDENT FACTS 1988, at 1.
Although the number of fatalities per miles driven has dropped dramatically over the last twenty
years, the number of injuries reported per miles driven has remained relatively constant. Id. at 9.
26. Liability insurance offers a larger amount of protection for a small capital outlay compared
to the alternate methods of showing financial responsibility. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.25
(1989) (minimum amount of financial security demonstrated by deposit of $60,000).
27. The Act currently requires minimum coverage of "twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000)
because of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident and, subject to said limit for
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In addition to liability coverage, the Act requires motor vehicle liability
policies to include uninsured motorist coverage unless the insured specifically
rejects coverage. 28 For policies written in amounts above the statutory mini-
mum, underinsured motorist coverage is also compulsory unless the insured re-
jects it.29 Uninsured motorist coverage protects the insured when he is injured in
a collision through no fault of his own and the tortfeasor has less liability insur-
ance than the Financial Responsibility Act requires.3 0 Underinsured motorist
coverage "is an outgrowth from and development of uninsured motorist insur-
ance." 31 It protects the insured when the tortfeasor has at least the minimum
required liability coverage, but less coverage than the insured and insufficient
coverage to compensate fully the insured. 32
Stacking uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage permits an injured
insured to increase his recovery following an accident by "add[ing] all available
policies together to create a greater pool in order to satisfy his actual dam-
ages."33 Stacking is a hotly contested issue because the insured's desire to obtain
a full recovery of his damages conflicts with the insurer's wish to minimize the
exposure of the insurance company. To achieve their goals, insurers have de-
vised a variety of policy provisions to preclude aggregated coverages. 34 There is
one person, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident." Id. § 20-279.21(b)(2). Ten thousand dollars property damage cover-
age is also required. Id.
28. Id. § 20-279.21(b)(3). For policies issued after October 1, 1986, rejection of either unin-
sured motorist coverage or underinsured motorist coverage by the insured must be in writing. Id.
§ 20-279.21(b)(3), (4).
29. Id. § 20-279.21(b)(4). Because the insured may reject coverage, different panels of the court
of appeals have employed conflicting rationales regarding whether UM and UIM coverage are le-
gally mandatory. Compare Aills v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 88 N.C. App. 595, 597, 363 S.E.2d
880, 882 (1988) ("[u]nderinsured motorists coverage is not required by law (since the insured may
reject the coverage)"), with Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C, App. 365, 366,
339 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1986) ("Uninsured motorist liability insurance coverage is compulsory in
North Carolina.").
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989). An uninsured motor vehicle is "a motor vehi-
cle as to which there is no bodily injury liability insurance" in at least the amount legally required, or
where the insurer "denies coverage.., or has become bankrupt." Id.
31. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 263, 382 S.E.2d at 762 (citing J. SNYDER, JR., NORTH CAROLINA
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW § 30-1 (1988)).
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4). An underinsured highway vehicle is "a highway vehi-
cle with respect to ... which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds
and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of
liability under the owner's policy." Id. In North Carolina underinsured motorist coverage is avail-
able only if uninsured coverage is also included in the policy. Id. State statutes vary greatly in their
treatment of UIM coverage. See. eg., NEV. REV. STAT. § 687B.145(2) (1985) (includes UIM within
the definition of UM); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3636(C) (West Supp. 1990) (UM applies anytime
the insured has a claim for more than the amount of the tortfeasor's coverage, "regardless of the
amount of coverage of either of the parties in relation to each other.").
33. 12A G. CoucH, supra note 2, § 45:651, at 207. Some courts restrict the term "stacking" to
circumstances in which an insured attempts to recover on his own multiple coverages, as opposed to
an insured who aggregates policies owned by different insureds. See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v.
Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 388-89 n.2, 446 A.2d 1059, 1060 n.2 (1982) ("Stacking is derived from the
presumption that when the named insured purchases uninsured motorist coverage on more than one
automobile, he intends to buy extra protection for himself and his family, regardless of whether his
injury occurs in any one of his insured vehicles or elsewhere." (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pac, 337
So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1977))).
34. See J. SNYDER, JR., NORTH CAROLINA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW § 33-1, at 205
(1988) ("The policy provisions by which uninsured motorist policies usually seek to prevent aggre-
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a split of authority among the states regarding the efficacy of policy provisions
that purport to limit aggregation of coverages.3 1
The "other insurance" or "excess escape" clause attempts to limit or pre-
clude interpolicy stacking by either a declaration that other insurance policies
which may be applicable must be exhausted first, or by a limitation of the total
liability of the insurer to the limits of one policy.3 6 In 1967 the North Carolina
Supreme Court first considered an "other insurance" clause that purported to
preclude interpolicy stacking of uninsured motorist coverage in Moore v. Hart-
ford Fire Insurance Co. Group.3 7 Beth Moore died after the car in which she was
a passenger collided with an uninsured tortfeasor.38 Two uninsured motorist
policies covered Mrs. Moore at the time of the accident; one issued to her hus-
band, the other to the third party with whom Mrs. Moore was riding.39 Invok-
ing the "other insurance" clause contained in Mr. Moore's policy, his insurer
denied payment, arguing that because the third party's policy had paid for Mrs.
Moore's injuries, and both policies had the same 5,000 dollar limitation of liabil-
ity, Mr. Moore's policy was excess and inapplicable. 4° The supreme court re-
jected the policy provision, holding that the Financial Responsibility Act "does
not permit 'other insurance' clauses in the policy which are contrary to the stat-
utory limited amount of coverage." 41 The court concluded that "our statute is
designed to protect the insured as to his actual loss within such limits."42
Moore allowed the plaintiff to stack coverages owned by different insureds.
gate coverage are generally known as 'other insurance clauses,' 'excess insurance clauses,' and 'limit
of liability clauses."' (footnote omitted)).
35. See 12A G. COUCH, supra note 2, § 45:628, at 77 (noting the spit of authority and the
current trend which seems to be in favor of stacking); see also Note, Stacking of Uninsured Motorist
Coverage in Nebraska: A Need for Clarification, 19 CREiGHTON L. Rv. 487, 495-98 (1985-86)
(noting three main justifications for stacking: public policy, ambiguity of policy provisions, and pay-
ment of multiple premiums).
36. . SNYDER, JR., supra note 34, § 33-3, at 207-08. The "Other Insurance" provision in the
standard automobile policy provides:
[I]f there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our share of the loss. Our
share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the total of all applicable limits.
However, any insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be
excess over any other collectible insurance.
Id. app. at 263.
37. 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
38. Id. at 533, 155 S.E.2d at 129.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 536, 155 S.E.2d at 131. The "other insurance" clause provided that the husband's
policy would apply "only in the amount by which the applicable limit of liability of this [policy]
exceeds the sum of the applicable limits of liability of all such other insurance." Id. at 534, 339
S.E.2d at 129. Both policies provided $5,000 for injury to one person and $10,000 for injuries to two
or more people. Because there were three injured passengers, Plaintiff had recovered only $3,333.33
from the third party's insurer. Id.
41. Id. at 543, 155 S.E.2d at 136. North Carolina's uninsured motorist statute defines the mini-
mum level of coverage that may be issued by the insurer. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3)
(1989); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.5(c) (1989). When Moore was decided, the statute required
$5,000 coverage for injuries to one person. Moore, 270 N.C. at 534-35, 155 S.E.2d at 130.
42. Moore, 270 N.C. at 543, 155 S.E.2d at 136; see also Turner v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 11
N.C. App. 699, 703, 182 S.E.2d 6, 8 (rejecting "other insurance" clause as "contrary to the intent
and provisions" of the uninsured motorist statute), cert. denied, 279 N.C. 397, 183 S.E.2d 247
(1971).
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The injured party clearly qualified as a "person insured" under each of the poli-
cies in question, as well as the uninsured motorist statute.43 One well-respected
writer in the insurance field has noted that the "logic" of stacking breaks down
when insureds who own multiple vehicles attempt to aggregate their coverage.44
Insurers charge separate premiums for each insured vehicle because of increased
exposure for the insurance company. This is true of the multiple premiums paid
for uninsured motorist (UM) or underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on mul-
tiple vehicles. 45 Courts that have upheld "first party" stacking generally have
ignored the increased exposure to the insurance company in insuring multiple
vehicles. The improbability of multiple accidents involving uninsured
tortfeasors may underlie the unwillingness of the courts to address this issue.46
In Hamilton v. Travelers Indemnity Co.47 the court of appeals considered
whether an injured party may stack uninsured motorist coverages owned by the
same insured. In Hamilton the plaintiff sued his insurer, seeking to stack unin-
sured motorist coverages on three vehicles that he owned. A single insurance
policy issued by the defendant covered all three vehicles. The policy contained a
limitation of liability clause similar to that in Sutton. Unlike the statute con-
strued in Sutton, however, North Carolina's uninsured motorist statute does not
mention stacking. Citing Moore, the court found stacking permissible under
North Carolina law.48 The court also cited Woods v. Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,49 a case in which the supreme court upheld stacking of medical pay-
ments coverage when the policy provisions could be interpreted to allow it.50
From these cases the Hamilton court concluded that stacking UM coverage is
permitted only if allowed by the terms of the policy.51 The limitation of liability
clause in the policy at issue purported to preclude stacking. Because there was
no clear conflict between the policy provision and the uninsured motorist stat-
ute, the court upheld the policy provision which prohibited stacking.52
Under the Hamilton rationale, stacking would rarely, if ever, occur. Be-
cause the insurance companies always draft policy language, insurers invariably
43. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989); infra text accompanying note 105.
44. See 8C J. APPLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5101, at 444-51.
45. For example, if Husband and Wife own two cars, and purchase uninsured motorist cover-
age for each car, it is possible that both Husband and Wife will be injured in separate accidents by
uninsured drivers. If both may stack the coverages from both vehicles, the insurance company must
pay for twice as much coverage as the insureds actually purchased.
46. The Minnesota Supreme Court viewed the issue as a windfall to either the insurer or the
insured. "[I]f the question must be resolved on the basis of who gets a windfall, it seems more just
that the insured who has paid a premium should get all he paid for rather than that the insurer
should escape liability for that for which it collected a premium." Van Tassel v. Horace Mann Mut.
Ins. Co., 296 Minn. 181, 187, 207 N.W.2d 348, 352 (1973).
47. 77 N.C. App. 318, 335 S.E.2d 228 (1985), dis- rev. denied, 315 N.C. 587, 341 S.E.2d 25
(1986).
48. Id. at 323-24, 335 S.E.2d at 232.
49. 295 N.C. 500, 246 S.E.2d 773 (1978).
50. See id. at 509, 246 S.E.2d at 779. The court did not distinguish between uninsured motorist
coverage, which is required by statute, and medical payments coverage-a totally voluntary cover-
age unregulated by statute. Id. at 508-10, 246 S.E.2d at 778-80; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(3), (g) (1989) (distinguishing statutorily required coverage from voluntary coverage).
51. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. at 324, 335 S.E.2d at 232.
52. Id.
1286 [Vol. 68
INSURANCE LAW
would include a limiting clause to preclude stacking. Recognizing the disparity
in bargaining positions, courts in other states have rejected this analysis.5 3
The court of appeals narrowed the scope of stacking UM coverage in Gov-
ernment Employees Insurance Co. v. Herndon.54 In Herndon separate insurance
policies issued by the same insurer covered two vehicles owned by the insured.5 5
Each policy provided 100,000 dollars of uninsured motorist coverage and each
contained an "other insurance" clause.5 6 After the insured's stepdaughter died
as a result of an accident which happened while she was a passenger in a vehicle
owned by a third party, the insured sought to stack the uninsured motorist cov-
erages contained in his two policies.5 7
Citing Moore, the Herndon court found stacking coverages from two or
more policies permissible when each policy provides "the mandatory minimum
coverage." 58 The Financial Responsibility Act specifies the mandatory mini-
mum amount of uninsured motorist coverage. 59 The Act also provides that the
insured is "entitled" to purchase additional coverage up to the amount of his
bodily injury liability coverage. 6° The Act specifically excludes "excess or addi-
tional" coverages from the requirements of the statute.61 Therefore, any amount
of uninsured motorist coverage above 25,000 dollars for one person and 50,000
dollars for two or more persons is excess or additional. 62
Because each of the policies in Herndon provided much more than the min-
imum required coverage, the court found that "[t]o the extent that the coverage
exceed[ed]" the amount required by law, the policy provisions controlled.63
Consequently, the "other insurance" clause precluded stacking."4 Herndon reaf-
53. See Great Cent. Ins. Co. v. Edge, 292 Ala. 613, 617, 298 So. 2d 607, 610 (1974) ("Cases
should not ... turn on how well the insurer drafts a limiting clause because the law does not permit
insurers to collect a premium for certain coverage, then take that coverage away by such a clause no
matter how clear or unambiguous it may be."); see also Fireman's Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 295 S.C. 538, 555, 370 S.E.2d 85, 94 (1988) (Ness, C.J., dissenting) ("It is common knowl-
edge that consumers are not at arms' length to bargain with the insurance industry."); 8C J. Ap-
PLEMAN, supra note 3, § 5067.15, at 16 (noting the unequal bargaining positions of insurer and
insured).
54. 79 N.C. App. 365, 339 S.E.2d 472 (1986).
55. Id. at 365-66, 339 S.E.2d at 472.
56. Id. at 366, 339 S.E.2d at 472-73. Each policy provided: "If this policy and any other auto
insurance policy issued to you apply to the same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your
injuries under all the policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one
policy." Id.
57. Id. at 366, 339 S.E.2d at 473.
58. Id. at 367, 339 S.E.2d at 473. The minimum mandatory coverage for UM coverage was and
is $25,000 for injury to one person. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989); 20-279.5(c) (1989).
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.21(b)(3); 20-279.5(c).
60. Id. § 20-279.21(b)(3).
61. Id. § 20-279.21(g). "Any policy... may also grant any lawful coverage in excess of or in
addition to the coverage specified for a motor vehicle liability policy and such excess or additional
coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this Article." Id.
62. See id. § 20-279.21(b)(3), (g).
63. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. at 368, 339 S.E.2d at 473-74; see also American Tours Inc. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.C. 341, 350, 338 S.E.2d 92, 98 (1986) ("an insurance company has the
right to enter into whatever insuring agreements it wishes to limit its voluntary coverages as opposed
to those statutorily required").
64. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. 365, 368, 339 S.E.2d 472, 474.
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firmed the holding in Moore that limiting clauses will not be enforced to pre-
clude recovery up to the minimum statutory coverage, but also established that
such clauses will be upheld when applied to coverage beyond the statutory
minimum.65
Unlike the courts before it, the Sutton court found specific statutory author-
ization for stacking underinsured motorist coverage. The supreme court began
its analysis of the statute by emphasizing the importance of legislative intent.66
Legislative intent, the court stated, can be ascertained "from the nature and
purpose of the act," as well as the "phraseology of the statute." 67 Because the
Financial Responsibility Act is a remedial statute, the court continued, it should
be "liberally construed so that the beneficial purpose intended by its enactment
may be accomplished." '68
The court then reviewed the specific language of the statute.69 The first
clause of the stacking paragraph refers to the owner's "coverages" and "poli-
cies."' 70 The court found this "clearly suggest[ed] the provision was intended to
require both ... intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking." 71 The second paragraph
of this part of the statute refers only to "instances where more than one policy
may apply." 72 This implies that the statute requires only interpolicy stacking.73
The court resolved the ambiguity in the statute by referring to the third clause of
the paragraph, which excludes fleet policies.74 Fleet coverage may insure dozens
of vehicles under a single policy. Because a fleet owner is not likely to own more
than two or three fleet policies, there is "no reason to distinguish between fleet
and nonfleet policies vis-a-vis interpolicy stacking."75 Noting that intrapolicy
stacking of a fleet policy would give the insured coverage "far in excess of what
either party bargained for," the court found that the specific exclusion of in-
trapolicy stacking for fleet vehicles in the statute evinced a legislative intent to
But see Turner v. Masias, 36 N.C. App. 213, 216, 243 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1978) (noting in dictum that
an "other insurance" clause "would be invalid to prevent the insured from being made whole").
65. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. at 368, 339 S.E.2d at 474.
66. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763.
67. Id.
68. Id. (citing Moore v. Hartford Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 535, 155 S.E.2d 128, 130.31 (1967)).
69. The statute provides in part:
In any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is
determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant pursuant to the
exhausted liability policy [of the tortfeasor] and the total limits of the owner's underinsured
motorist coverages provided in the owner's policies of insurance; it being the intent of this
paragraph to provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the
benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies:
Provided that this paragraph shall apply only to nonfleet private passenger motor vehicle
insurance ....
Id. at 262, 382 S.E.2d at 761 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis by the
supreme court)).
70. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989).
71. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763.
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
73. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763.
74. Id. at 266, 382 S.E.2d at 763-64; see supra note 69.
75. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 266, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
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require intrapolicy stacking for nonfleet vehicles. 76 The court, therefore, upheld
both intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking.7 7
The Sutton court found its analysis strengthened because it was "consistent
with the nature and purpose of the act, which... is to compensate innocent
victims of financially irresponsible motorists."78 The court noted that an insured
pays separate premiums for each UIM coverage, so stacking permits the insured
to receive the full benefit of his bargain.79 Numerous state courts have followed
this rationale to permit stacking.80
The court also found its interpretation consistent with North Carolina's
pre-existing common law which construed automobile insurance policies "to re-
quire intrapolicy stacking of medical payments coverage... and uninsured mo-
torist coverage." 8 1 The court cited Hamilton v. Travelers Indemnity Co.8 2 for the
proposition that North Carolina's pre-existing common law construed insurance
policies to require stacking of uninsured motorist coverage and stated that Sut-
ton was consistent with earlier case law.8 3 The court of appeals in Hamilton,
however, upheld an anti-stacking clause and did not permit stacking.8 4
The Sutton court rejected defendant's argument that the statute should not
control "to the extent the policy coverages at issue exceed[ed] the mandatory
minimum coverage required by the Financial Responsibility Act."8 5 The insurer
in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Herndon successfully raised this ar-
gument to preclude stacking of uninsured motorist coverage.8 6 Unlike UM cov-
erage, however, the Financial Responsibility Act requires the amount of
underinsured motorist coverage to equal the amount of the insured's bodily in-
jury liability coverage.8 7 For this reason, the Sutton court held that underin-
sured motorist coverage "can never be any excess or additional... coverage"
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
80. See, eg., Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 288 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1973) (not-
ing that it is "useless and meaningless and uneconomic to pay for additional bodily injury insurance
and simultaneously have this coverage cancelled by an insurer's exclusion"); Fidelity & Casualty Co.
of N.Y. v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) ('It would be unconscionable to
permit insurers to collect a premium for a coverage which they are required by statute to provide,
and then to avoid payment of a loss because of language of limitation devised by themselves.")
(citing Simpson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (S.D. Ind. 1970)).
81. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764 (citations omitted). See Woods v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 508-09, 246 S.E.2d 773, 779 (1978) (permitting stacking of medical
payments coverage); Hamilton v. Travelers Indem. Co., 77 N.C. App. 318, 324, 335 S.E.2d 228, 232
(1985) (rejecting stacking of UM coverage), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 587, 341 S.E.2d 25 (1986).
82. 77 N.C. App. 318, 335 S.E.2d 228 (1985), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 587, 341 S.E.2d 25(1986).
83. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
84. Hamilton, 77 N.C. App. at 324, 335 S.E.2d at 232. See supra text accompanying notes 47-
52.
85. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
86. 79 N.C. App. 365, 368, 339 S.E.2d 472, 473-74 (1986). See supra text accompanying notes
55-65.
87. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989).
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within the meaning of the statute.88
This portion of Sutton is significant because it exposes an arbitrary and un-
fair distinction between uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages under
the current North Carolina statute. The Sutton court noted in dictum the close
relationship between underinsured motorist coverage and uninsured motorist
coverage, but did not address the inconsistencies that now exist between the two
coverages.8 9 Since the statute establishes the minimum amount of UM coverage
that must be provided, any amount above this minimum is "excess" and the
insurer may successfully preclude stacking by an appropriate policy provision. 90
Underinsured motorist coverage, on the other hand, can never be excess, so in-
surers may not preclude stacking. 91
It is unclear why the General Assembly failed to provide for stacldng of
UM coverage while mandating stacking of UIM coverage. When the General
Assembly passed the 1985 amendment, 92 both Moore v. Hartford Insurance
Co.9 3 and Turner v. Nationwide Insurance Co.94 strongly suggested that stacking
was permissible for UM coverage even without specific statutory authoriza-
tion.9 5 Sutton confirmed that the common law of North Carolina favors stack-
ing.96 The lack of an uninsured stacking statute does not necessarily mean that
insurers should be allowed to preclude aggregation. The courts of several states
have approved stacking of UM coverage and rejected contrary policy provisions
based on both public policy grounds and the payment of multiple premiums. 97
The North Carolina Supreme Court has long recognized that public policy
may limit the contractual rights of insurance companies. 98 Protecting innocent
insureds is the "avowed purpose" of the Financial Responsibility Act.99
Although the legislature explicitly provided for stacking only UIM coverage, the
88. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765.
89. Id. at 264, 382 S.E.2d at 762 ("Given the close relationship between uninsured and underin-
sured coverages the principles applicable to uninsured motorist intrapolicy stacking should be
equally applicable to factual situations giving rise to underinsured intrapolicy stacking questions,").
90. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
91. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765.
92. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
93. 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967).
94. 11 N.C. App. 699, 182 S.E.2d 6, cert. denied, 279 N.C. 397, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971).
95. See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
96. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
97. See, eg., Jimenez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 107 N.M. 322, 325, 757 P.2d 792, 795
(1988) ("lA]n insurer's attempt by a limiting clause to preclude stacking of additional coverage
separately paid for by the insured violates the clear policy of the uninsured motorist statute, which
intends that an injured party be compensated to the extent of coverage obtained by or for the injured
party."); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Gatlin, 470 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971)
(finding limiting provision unconscionable). But see Sanders v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 148 Vt.
496, 507, 536 A.2d 914, 921 (1987) (holding policy provision valid because not unconscionable and
not in conflict with the state's underinsured motorist law).
98. "Freedom of contract, unless contrary to public policy or prohibited by statute, is a funda-
mental right included in our constitutional guaranties." Muncie v. Travelers Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 74,
79, 116 S.E.2d 474, 478 (1960) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds,
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. C. G. Tate Constr. Co., 303 N.C. 387, 396, 279 S.E.2d 769, 774 (1981)
(holding that failure of insured promptly to notify insurer of accident does not excuse insurer unless
its ability to inquire into the circumstances of the accident has been prejudiced by the delay).
99. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763.
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important public policy of protecting innocent victims of automobile accidents is
broader than one particular type of coverage. Given the statutory distinctions
between UM and UIM coverage, the issue then becomes whether the protection
given by UM coverage should extend only to the minimum required coverage, or
to the insured's actual loss.
Uninsured motorist coverage was originally designed to place the injured
party in the position he would have been in if the tortfeasor had purchased the
minimum required liability insurance coverage.10° Before the advent of UIM
coverage, providing the minimum required coverage was the clear purpose be-
hind mandatory first person coverage. The insurance industry created UIM
coverage, however, because of recognized deficiencies in UM protection.' 0 ' De-
spite statements by the North Carolina Supreme Court that the purpose of the
Financial Responsibility Act is to protect against "financially irresponsible mo-
torists,"'1 2 the Act now reaches far beyond these motorists and may protect
injured insureds even when the tortfeasor has a great deal of liability cover-
age. 0 3 The Sutton court noted that requiring stacking "enhances the injured
party's potential for full recovery of all damages."' 4 Insureds injured by unin-
sured motorists should have the same potential for full recovery.
North Carolina defines "persons insured" very broadly for UM and UIM
coverage. Included are "the named insured and, while resident of the same
household, the spouse of any such named insured and relatives of either, while in
a motor vehicle or otherwise," and any person using or riding in the vehicle with
the permission of the owner. 105 The North Carolina Court of Appeals inter-
preted the statute to include two classes of "persons insured."'1 6 The named
insured, his spouse, and relatives living with them are Class I insureds, while
those persons occupying the vehicle with the owner's permission are Class II
insureds. 10 7 Class I insureds may recover regardless of whether they are in the
insured vehicle, while recovery by Class II insureds is predicated upon using or
100. 2 A. WIDISS, supra note 1, § 31.1, at 3-4.
101. Id. § 31.2, at 4. See also ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COUNCIL, COMPENSATION
FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES-SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 10 (1989) ("Fatal-
ity and permanent total disability claims... represent a small but very expensive segment of the auto
injury population."). The insurance industry projects average economic losses of $314,239 for UM
coverage and $416,468 for UIM coverage for permanent total disabilities and fatalities of insureds.
Id.
102. Eg., Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763.
103. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1989) (only requirement for recovery under U1M
coverage is that tortfeasor have less coverage than the insured). Underinsured motorist coverage
may apply even when the tortfeasor has a large liability insurance policy. In contrast, UM coverage
will apply only when the tortfeasor has less than $25,000 worth of coverage available to the injured
party. The insured who is injured by an uninsured driver needs aggregated coverage more than the
insured who is injured by a tortfeasor with a large policy. Had the plaintiff in Sutton been injured by
an uninsured motorist, her recovery apparently would have been limited to $100,000 (four cars
multiplied by $25,000 minimum mandatory coverage), as opposed to the $300,000 UIM coverage
she was allowed to aggregate.
104. Sutton, 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989).
106. Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551,554, 340 S.E.2d
127, 129, disc rev. denied, 316 N.C. 731, 345 S.E.2d 387 (1986).
107. Id. at 554, 340 S.E.2d at 129-30.
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riding in the insured vehicle. 10 8
Sutton established that limiting provisions may not preclude stacking of
UIM coverage for which an insured has paid additional premiums. 1 The deci-
sion, however, raises the question as to who may stack underinsured motorist
coverage. Plaintiff in Sutton was a Class I insured because she was driving her
own vehicle at the time she was injured. The supreme court made no distinction
between classes because the issue was not before it. The North Carolina courts
have yet to determine whether Class II insureds may stack coverages. 110
Among jurisdictions with well-established traditions of stacking, there is a
split of authority on the issue of stacking by Class II insureds. 1 I The weight of
authority prohibits stacking in this context. 112 The courts that have rejected
stacking by Class II insureds have relied on the temporary status of the in-
sureds,113 the lack of a contractual relationship between the insured and the
insurer,114 the fact that the insured did not pay the premiums for the cover-
age,1" 5 and the determination that stacldng coverage owned by a third party is
not a reasonable expectation of the passenger.116
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Connecticut approved stacking by Class
II insureds and characterized that state's UM coverage as "'person oriented'
rather than 'vehicle oriented.' "117 In Estate of Calibuso v. Pacific Insurance
Co. 118 the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected the distinction between classes al-
together because nothing in the state's statute, or in the insurance policy con-
108. Id. at 554-55, 340 S.E.2d at 130. More recently, however, the court of appeals obfuscated
the classification scheme. See Driscoll v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 90 N.C. App. 569, 572, 369
S.E.2d 110, 112 (upholding "household-owned vehicle" exclusion and rejecting UIM coverage under
daughter's policy for mother injured while riding in husband's automobile), disc. rev. denied, 323
N.C. 364, 373 S.E.2d 544 (1988). The limiting clause upheld in Driscoll directly contravenes the
underinsured motorist statute.
109. 325 N.C. at 267, 382 S.E.2d at 764.
110. The following hypothetical illustrates the issue: If A owns two vehicles, each with UIM
coverage, and B, a nonrelative who does not live with A, is injured while riding in A's car, should B
be allowed to stack A's coverage?
Ill. Compare Travelers Ins. Co. v. Jones, 529 So. 2d 234, 240 (Ala. 1988) (permitting stacking
of UM coverage by passengers because they were within the definition of insured in the policy) with
Beeny v. California State Auto. Ass'n Inter-Ins. Bureau, 104 Nev. 1, 4-5, 752 P.2d 756, 758 (1988)
(rejecting stacking of third party's coverage because coverage arose only by occupying the covered
vehicle).
112. See Babcock v. Adkins, 695 P.2d 1340, 1342 (Okla. 1984) (citing cases on both sides of the
issue and finding that the clear weight of authority rejects stacking); see also Woods v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 507-08, 246 S.E.2d 773, 778 (1978) (rejecting stacking of third party's
medical payment coverage).
113. Eg., Lopez v. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co., 98 N.M. 166, 172, 646 P.2d 1230, 1236 (1982);
Prideaux v. Allstate Ins. Co., 753 P.2d 935, 936-37 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
114. Eg., General Accident Ins. Co. v. St. Peter, 334 Pa. Super. 6, 11, 482 A.2d 1051, 1054
(1984).
115. Id.
116. E.g., Babcock v. Adkins, 695 P.2d 1340, 1342-43 (Okla. 1984).
117. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ferrante, 201 Conn. 478, 486, 518 A.2d 373, 377 (1986); see also Sayers
v. Safeco Ins. Co., 628 P.2d 659, 662 (Mont. 1981) (finding no reason to distinguish'between persons
insured and policyholders who actually paid the premiums because "[tihe justification for stacking
lies not in who has paid for the extra protection, but rather that the protection has been purchased.
The benefits flow to all persons insured.").
118. 62 Haw. 424, 616 P.2d 1357 (1980).
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strued in that case, made an explicit distinction between classes. 119
Although only a minority of courts have approved stacking by Class II
insureds, a broad reading of the North Carolina stacking provision could reach
this result. 120 The North Carolina statute defining "persons insured," however,
distinguishes between classes and limits recovery for Class II insureds to circum-
stances in which they are in a vehicle owned by the named insured.' 2 ' This
limitation, in conjunction with the fact that Class II insureds pay no premiums,
suggests that stacking by Class II insureds will not be allowed. 122
Regardless of which UIM insureds may stack, the inequality between UM
and UIM stacking remains. One solution to the present disparity between the
two types of coverage would be to amend the UM statute and replicate the cur-
rent UIM scheme by tying the amount of UM coverage to the amount of the
insured's liability coverage, thus making UM coverage mandatory within the
meaning of the statute. A better solution, however, would be to permit insureds
to purchase UM and UIM coverage in any amount, unrestricted by the amount
of liability insurance purchased.' 2 3 Although stacking offers insureds a greater
opportunity to recover the full amount of their damages, it may not help in-
sureds who own only one vehicle.
It is unclear what purpose is served by limiting the maximum amount of
UM/UIM coverage to the amount of liability insurance purchased. Because the
Financial Responsibility Act establishes the minimum amount of liability cover-
age, there is no reason for requiring an insured to carry as much protection for
third parties as for herself.124 Liability insurance is much more expensive than
UM/UIM coverage. Consequently, the additional expense may deter many in-
sureds from seeking more protection.' 2 5
119. Id. at 433, 616 P.2d at 1361-62.
120. See supra note 69.
121. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1989).
122. A recent court of appeals decision, rendered five months after Sutton, further obscures the
question of who may stack UIM coverage. In Smith v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 97 N.C. App. 363,
388 S.E.2d 624 (1990), the court upheld a policy provision that precluded stacking by the family of a
person killed while driving a family-owned vehicle. Id. at 371, 388 S.E.2d at 629. The decision in
that case, however, is highly questionable. The court recognized that, had the decedent been riding
in a vehicle owned by a third party, stacking would have been permissible. Id. As the dissent in that
case noted, the death of a Class I insured in a family-owned instead of a neighbor's vehicle "is no
proper basis" for determining whether or not stacking applies. Id. at 371, 388 S.E.2d at 629-30
(Phillips, J., dissenting). The North Carolina Supreme Court is expected to hear oral argument in
Smith in the fall of 1990. See also Schwochert v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 139 Wis. 2d 335,
351, 407 N.W.2d 525, 532 (1987) (upholding a similar policy provision). But see Hettenhausen v.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 154 III. App. 3d 488, 493, 507 N.E.2d 121, 125 (1987) (holding a
similar policy provision unenforceable because it would defeat the purpose of UIM coverage); Lewis
v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 503 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (permitting father to stack son's UM
coverage because family members "cannot be restricted to a special class of vehicles"), rev. denied,
511 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1987).
123. Such an amendment would require a specific provision removing UM and UIM coverages
from the mandatory/additional coverage dichotomy of the current statute if stacking is to be al-
lowed. There still would need to be a minimum mandatory level of coverage since insurance compa-
nies are known for writing coverage at the lowest possible level. See A. WIDss, A GUIDE TO
UNINSURED MoTORIST COVERAGE § 2.37a, at 122-23 (1969 & Supp. 1981).
124. See 2 A. WIDISs, supra note 1, § 41.7, at 101-02 (noting there is no flnctional connection
between the two types of coverage).
125. See id. § 41.5, at 89.
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The supreme court's decision in Sutton is a positive step in promoting the
important public policy of protecting innocent victims of financially irresponsi-
ble motorists. It is unclear whether the court will extend the public policy to
encompass uninsured motorist coverage. It is clear, however, that the North
Carolina General Assembly could offer even more protection to insureds by al-
lowing them to purchase uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in
amounts that are not linked to the amount of liability coverage purchased.
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